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BARGAINING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RETUBNS IN THE
PURCHASE OF TECHNOLOGY BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
by Constantine V. Vaitsos*
The intellectual tradition of most niodern economists (at
least in the "Western" world) is such that they explicitly or
implicitly associate the allocation of resources and distribution
of returns with the market mechanism and a price system. Aside
of issues that arise with respect to the degree of "purity" and
"perfection" of the market-price system (a subject that has long
been discussed) economists who accept it implicitly assume, among
other things, that (a) goods, services and factors of production
are "individually owned" (by persons or f irais) and (b) the parties
participating in an exchange are able to assess the values of the
economic units transacted. The market within which technology
is being commercialized violates both assumptions related to the
price system, as it is traditionally defined. Consequently,
technology commercialization can best be described through other
mechanisms, and one that appears most appropriate is that of
bargaining. Policy makers, therefore, who concentrate on the
"price mechanism" (as taught to us by traditional economic theory)
in order to maximize their country's interests when technology
is being purchased are misorienting themselves completely.
The reasons are the following. Technology, being a form of
information, is "non-exhaustible". Its use contrasts with the
usage (or consumption) of an item which is "individually owned",
in which case the availability to others (or to the same person
in the future) is at least partially reduced through wear and
tear. Technology, then, is by nature "jointly" and not
"individually" owned. The usage of information by a person or
f irai does not in itself reduce its present or future availability.
Information is "non-exhaustible"; the price mechanism that could
satisfy the efficient transfer of "individually" owned goods is
inappropriate in this case.
The marginal cost of using or selling an already developed
technology is zero for the owner of that technology Where
cases of adaptation arise the owner incurs certain costs which
can be estimated and usually do not exceed a figure in the tens
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of thousands of dollars. In several industries the sellers of
technology to developing countries have themselves copied such
technology from the originators who incurred the R. & D. expenses.(A systematic study undertaken in the petrochemicals industry
indicated that during the period after original development when
technology sales to developing countries were most likely to
occur the original producers of a product or process accounted
only for 1% of the total licensing. The remaining 9 was
divided between "followers" of commercial producers (5) and
engineering firms (47%)),2 On the other hand, from the point of
view of the purchaser the marginal cost of developing an altern-
ative technology with his own technical capacity might amount to
millions of dollars. Or he might be unable to develop it, or at
least think so, in which case his relative marginal cost is
infinite. Given market availabilities, the price between zero
or tens cf thousands of dollars, and millions of dollars or
infinite is, in turn, determined solely on the basis a crude rela-
tive bargaining power. There is no price which a priori can be
claimed to be more or less appropriate within the two limits
specified.
A further consideration arises as to whether information,
technology or ideas are "owned", to start with, in accordance with
the traditional definition of property. Ideas can certainly be
captive either legally (i.e. patent privileges) or technically(i.e. in case they are kept secret, or when a potential user does
not have the knowledge to absorb and use certain information).
But can they be "owned"? It has been argued that ".... property
in ideas once published is an insoluble contradiction.... (He
who argues that his ideas have been stolen)..., complains that
something has been stolen which he still possesses, and he wants
1 For an analysis of marginal versus full cost considerations in
the development of new as well as the sale of already developed
technology that is purchased by the "non-industrialized" world
see C.V. Vaitsos: "Transfer of Resources and Preservation of
Monopoly Rents", paper presented at the Dubronik Conference of the
Development Advisory Service cf Harvard University, June 20-26,
1970, pp. 18-21.
2 R. Stobaugh "Utilizing Technical Know-how in a Foreign Invest-
ment and Licensing Program", paper delivered to the National
Meeting, Chemical Marketing Research Association, 1970, p.5.
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back something which, if given to him a thousand times, would add
nothing to his possession".1 Furthermore, how can "ownership" be
claimed in inventions or ideas when any advancement in thought is
a result of dependence on and further elaborations of previous
inventions or ideas?2 The ditinction between "ownership" and
"captivity" leads us to the following consideration. In part of
the market of technology commercialization an external mechanism
is interposed so as to create, artificially, a scarcity which in
turn results in a price system. Such interposition is achieved
through patents. "Clearly the patent system is our attempt to
include the production of inventions in the same framework of
pri3ing as the production of other things, and to do this by
creating scarcity - by limiting the use of the invention.... So
far as inventions are concerned a price is put on them not because
they are scarce but in order to make them scarce to those who
want to use them" .3
The second assumption made about the price system as an
efficient means of allocating resources implies that "the parties
participating in an exchange are able to assess the values of the
economic units transacted". Here again the existing market of
technology commercialization not only differs from that of the
price system, but also places the purchaser in a structural
position of basic weakness. In the formulation of the demand for
technology, or for information in general, the prospective buyer
needs information about the properties, potential results, altern-
ative offers, etc. of the item he intends to purchase. In this
respect the technology market is no different from all other
Hermann Rentzach, "Geistiges Eigenthum" Handwrterbuch der
Volkswirtschaft, Leipzig 1866, p. 333.
2,,It is little short of absurdity to call any one of the inter-
related units the invention, and its 'creator' inventor.
The man who brought to a certain stage of fruition the efforts of
myriad successors, and whom therefore we call the inventor, may
have made a great contribution. But seen in its proper setting
& perspective, the contribution is something less than cataclysmic"
Alfred E. Kahn "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent
Law", American Economic Review, y. 30 (1940) p. 478.
Edith T. Penrose The Economics of the International Patent
System, The John Hopkins Press, 1951, p. 29.
1 The following discussion is based on C.V. Vaitsos, o. cit.
pp. 10ff. The quotation is from p.11.
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markets. Yet quite often, the item itself that one needs to
purchase (i.e. technology) is at the came time the information
that is needed in order to make a rational decision to buy it.
What is needed is lmowledge about knowledge, which could off oc-
tively be one and the sane thing. As a result the assumed roles
of an efficient market mechanism break down, at least on the part
of the buyer. In evaluating contracts of technology purchase by
developing countries one is incnediately struck by the total
vagueness by which technical assistance is being acquired contrac-
tually. The licensor is quite generally left with complete
freedom to transfer whatever he decides while the purchaser has
explicit and fixed conditions with respect to payments, terms of
obligations, etc. The buyer, quite often, does not know what
to ask0
The properties of the market of technology transfer are
therefore, such that the mechanism that best describes its func-
tioning is the process of bargaining (and not the traditionally
defined market-price system). The buyer is, moreover, placed in
a position of structural weakness in the formulation of his demand
for information. We now have to consider why developing countries
confront, in addition, other problems which further diminish their
relative bargaining power and hence increase the cost of techn-
ology acquisition. I shall be briefly treating three general
aspects.
I. The process of industrialization through final product
import substitution of the "late-late corners" has been such that
developing countries basically confine themselves to the trans-
formation (and not properly the production) of products that have
been imported from abroad. Within this context technology
ptrchase involves, to a great extent, know-how embodied in inter-
mediate products and capital goods. As a result purchases of the
latter are tied-in with the purchase of technology. A study
undertaken in Colombia showed that all the contracts of technology
commercialization that provided information on intermediate product
purchases, explicitly reqired the purchase of such products from
the seller of technology.' In addition, even if contractual terms
do not so specify, the know-how purchase often defines (sometimes
quite uniquely) the origin of intermediate products. As a result
the market of such products becomes monopolistic (i.e. the licensee
of Pfizer Co. has to buy tetracycline from Pfizer since the latter
is the only one that can export the product to a country if it
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owns the patent that covers the product. A licensee of Toyota
has to import components from the licensor since the technology
embodied in the chassis and assemblying of Toyota cars requires
specific Toyota components). Fron research in Colombia and
extrapolating from a sample that included 25% of the imports of
4.-5c% of the pharmaceutical industry, it was estimated that the
country paid for intermediate products in 1968 close to US,....
20,000,000 solely due to price differentials above those available
in the "international" market for the same products. Price
dirferentials were observed in each one of the sectors studied
which included chemicals, electronics and rubber products.
"Defining as effective returns to the parent corporation the sum
of reported profits of the subsidiary, royalty payments and inter-
mediate product cverpricing, the following data can be inferred
from our sample of the Colombian pharmaceutical industry. Reported
profits constituted 3,4% of effective returns, royalties 14.0% and
'overpricing' 82.6%". In view of such overpricing the basis for
costing technology arid/or capital (in case of foreign direct
investment) cannot be found in royalty payments or in declared
profit repatriation, but has to rest on the prices paid for inter-
mediate products and capital goods. Tie-in arrangemeats resulting
from contractual terms and/or technical requirements and/or
ownership ties, have properties which make the market price system
a poor mechanism to distribute benefits while protecting the
interests of developing countries.
II. Markets where prices are settled through bargaining,
like the labor market, have generally developed explicit mati-
tutional methods and rules upon which negotiations are settled.
Such methods enable the participating parties to protect their
interests by the proper definition cf the negotiable elements,
maximum and minimum psitions cf bargaining, identification of
areas where the other party is most or least likely to "give-in"
etc. Industrialized countries, both because of the sophistication
mid size of their companies, and because of the existence of
specialized government agencies (cf. MITI and JETRO in Japan) have
enabled their technology buyers to negotiate with considerable
knowledge and intelligence. Developing countries, however, in
spite cf being highly dependent upon foreign technology, have not
yet shown an awareness cf the critical problems involved.
To start with a large part of foreign know-how is introduced
through the establishment of foreign owned companies. Such
subsidiaries lack even a minimum negotiating position since their
interests are, presumably, identified with those of their parent
corporation and not with the host country. (For example, it is
not uncommon to encounter cases where a foreign wholly-owned
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subsidiary has capitalized in its books technology that originated
fron the parent corporation. As a result it could be (a) paying
royalties, (b) reducing its tax payments through depreciation
"charges" of intangible assets, (c) having lower tax coefficients
in countries where taxable profits are related to "invested"
capital and (d) claiming higher capital repatriations in countries
with exchange controls, all for the same know-how. Clearly a
foreign owned subsidiary does not need to capitalize technology
since 100% of its capital is already owned by its parent).
Institutional mechanisms and procedures to handle adequate
bargaining of foreign technology purchases are lacking not only in
cases of parent-subsidiary situatians, or with respect to the
proper definition of implicit costs that result from intermediate
product overpricing (an item which is usually left out of the
negotiating process). Procedures are also inadequate for the
evaluation of even the explicit, negotiable elements in technology
purchase such as royalty payments. They are usually negotiated
on the basis of sales, and not with respect to the income gener-
ating effects of technology, such as profits for firms and domestic
value-added for countries. As a result of this mis-specification
of the "economic effects" of a particular know-how purchase one
encounters cases where royalty payments, which appear quite
"reasonable" with respect to sales, amount to a multiple of profits
or value added. (One result of the present system is that a
country's payments on technology that originated from abroad rise
proportionately with its final product tariffs).
The inadequacy of the present bargaining system stems partly
from the lack of any adequate specifications of what is meant by
technology importation. When evaluating contracts in developing
countries one generally encounters the tautological definition
that technological purchase implies the importation of know-how.
The issue arises as to what, at least operationally, is the techno-
logy that a country is importing for a given industry, or process
or product. Is it technical assistance which is transmitted
through personnel, or a manual with production specifications, or
a license of a patent (which clearly is not technology but the
legal permission to use technology), or know-how already embodied
in intermediate products and machinery, or factory layouts, or
what? Each of these different types of technology importation
has different potential alternative sources of supply and hence
different alternative prices; expresses different types and
degrees of dependence between technology supplier and receiver;
has attached to it different types of obligations and rights for
the contracting parties, etc. The type of technology needed by
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developing countries in their present industrial stage is amply
available around the world. Therefore, the breakdown of what is
collectively referred to as technology importation and the exact
specification of each of its parts would make it possible to
transform a market which is at present almost totally monopolistic,
into a competitive one. The degree of this competitiveness will
depend on the amount of information a potential buyer has in the
pursuit of information purchase.
1110 It is not surprising that a market whose basic properties
have been left so inadequately defined is also characterized by a
totally inappropriate legal framework at least as far as developing
countries are concerned. The contractual terms by which techno-
logy is being sold to developing countries violate the basic
principles of anti-monopoly or anti-trust legislations through
which developed countries attempt to protect the interests of their
national economies. For example, a clause which is most common
in technology sales is that of export prohibition. In the
already referred to sample of nationally owned firms and joint
ventures in the Colombian chemical, textile and pharmaceutical
sectors, 85 of the contracts studied explicitly prohibited exports
of products manufactured with the use of imported technology.
Also 33 out of 35 contracts that were concerned with making infor-
mation available, explicitly required the purchase of intermediate
products from the technology supplier. Similar clauses exist for
the purchase of capital goods, hiring of key personnel, level and
structure of production, price fixing for sale or resale of goods
etc. Legal and administrative procedures have been set up in
developed countries to regulate such practices. The basic legis-
lation that exists in developing countries with respect to the
impact and ramifications of technology importation is mostly
related to the limits imposed on the business practices of their
own nationals and not those of the sellers of technology. For
example, legislation on technology importation in developing
countries is mostly identified with industrial property legislation
such a. patent laws. No relevant economic analysis is being
pursued as to whether patents really protect the interests of the
Itnon_indus trialized" countries, while legal sys tens are transplanted
Examples of legal procedures are Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, article 85 (i) of the Rome Treaty,
article 37 of the Price Ordenance of France, the Economic
Competition Act of 1958, Netherlands, etc.; of administrative
procedures: US Internal Revenue Service, Code 492.
from developed nations whose needs and interests are totally
different01
C onclud Ing Remarks
Countries do not make resource allocation on education,
defense, space prograJn, public health, etc. on the basis of the
market-price system. The particular characteristics of the
"markets" in these areas are quite distinct from the properties
and image we inherited from the "economic liberalism" of the
previous century. Nations have, thus, attempted to introduce
other means in order to allocate resources and distribute benefits.
(Some of them, like the voting process, do not even fall within
the strict definition of economic market system). Technology
importation has structural properties that make the market-price
mechanism totally inadequate in the process of defending the
interests of the receiving countries. Once this has been under-
stood, a new system, long overdue, can be developed which enables
developing countries to take advantage of technology.
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"...Provisions (of the modern international patent system), it
is evident, have altered the complexion of the patent grant from
one designed primarily to stimulate domestic iúdustry to one in
which the foreign patentee has an increased chance of producing
where he chooses and retaining his patent monopoly" United States
Government, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th Congress,
ist Session, study on "The Thternational Patent System and
Foreign Policy", Washington, 1957, p.3.
